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Children in Scotland are held criminally responsible from the age of 8, 
something that has attracted wholly-justified criticism within the country 
and from international organisations including the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. Despite the fact that this puts Scots 
law in the same camp as some of the world’s least progressive regimes, 
proposals to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility have, to date, 
been rejected. For the second time this century, a government-appointed 
advisory group recently recommended raising the age to 12.  
 
Setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility, in Scotland, in the 
context of historical, international and comparative developments and the 
burgeoning contemporary literature, this article argues that the climate for 
change has never been better. It predicts that, this time, the advisory 
group’s recommendation will result in legislative reform and highlights the 
challenges that will result.  
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Any discussion of juvenile justice in Scotland tends to focus on the children’s hearings 
system, an approach that was regarded as particularly ground-breaking when it was 
introduced in 1971 and continues to attract approval. The hearings system takes a 
holistic approach to the needs of both victimised and troublesome children and young 
people, offering supportive, non-punitive measures, premised on what will serve the 
welfare of the child, where intervention is required. While the hearings system has 
undergone reform over the years, safeguarding and promoting the child’s welfare 
remains at its core.  
 
Yet alongside this picture of enlightenment, the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
in Scotland remains 8 years old, often described as being the lowest in Europe,1 putting 
Scotland in the same camp as some of the world’s least progressive legal systems. It is 
no surprise that this has attracted criticism within the country and from bodies no less 
august than the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and the United 
Nations Committee on Human Rights.  
 
In its most recent Concluding Observations, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
again criticised the low age of criminal responsibility throughout the United Kingdom but, 
this time, it emphasised the positive, with the words: 
The Committee notes that the Scottish government is open to raising the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility and that an Advisory Group was 
established to explore these issues and develop recommendations for 
consultation.2 
 
                                                          
1 This description is not wholly accurate since a number of European countries, including France and 
Luxemburg, have no stated minimum age. See, Don Cipriani, Children's Rights and the Minimum Age of 
Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective (Ashgate, Farnham 2009), chapter 5.  
2 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic 
report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, 3 June 2016, para 
77. 
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That advisory group recommended raising the age of criminal responsibility to 123 and, 
in response, the Scottish Government undertook a public consultation on the matter. 
There has been widespread support for the recommendation, certainly from the legal 
profession, children’s rights groups and academics. But we have been here before only 
to find the prospect of reform coming to nought. This article examines the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility in Scotland in the context of historical, international and 
comparative developments and the burgeoning contemporary literature. It argues that 
the climate for change has never been better and predicts that, this time, the law will be 
reformed, but warns that there are consequential challenges still to be addressed. 
 
The story so far 
 
When viewed from a contemporary perspective, the adult criminal justice system of 
previous ages, with its emphasis on physical punishment, transportation and capital 
sentences, seems barbaric. Indeed, it was. Yet that system provides the context in which 
juvenile justice of the time must be understood. Thus, it is somewhat heartening to find 
that, when the Scottish institutional writers from the seventeenth century onwards 
explored the different treatment of juveniles, they addressed issues that the modern 
reader would recognise as being at the heart of the current debate on criminal 
responsibility: the capacity of children to understand the wrongfulness of the act;4 their 
opportunity to make choices; their ability to instruct a defence and, thus, secure a fair 
trial; and the relevance of age in sentencing. The fascinating nuances of their 
deliberations are discussed elsewhere and need not detain us.5 For our present purpose, 
it is enough to know that, in Scotland, children below the age of seven years old were 
regarded as ‘incapable of crime’.6 Minor children, being those between the ages of 7 and 
                                                          
3 The Report of the Advisory Group on the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (The Scottish 
Government, Edinburgh 2016), 11. 
4 Sir George Mackenzie, The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (1678), I, I, 7. 
5 For an excellent discussion, see, Claire McDiarmid, Childhood and Crime (Dundee University Press, 
Dundee 2007), chapter 5. 
6 Archibald Alison, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland (first published 1832, The Law Society of 
Scotland and Butterworths, Edinburgh 1989) 666. David Hume made the same point in his Commentaries 
on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes (first published 1819, The Law Society of Scotland, Edinburgh 
1986), i, 35. 
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14, were generally thought to be exempt from capital punishment7 and there are 
numerous examples of ‘leniency’ being shown in sentencing on account of the minority 
of the offender.8   
  
While separate juvenile courts were established by the Children Act 1908, the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility remained untouched until 1928, when the first separate 
Scottish inquiry into the care and protection of children and the treatment of juvenile 
offenders reported.9  It recommended raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
to eight.10  The report gives only a brief explanation for this very minor change and one is 
left with the impression that the committee would have liked to raise the age further. It 
may have been that it, like so many similar bodies since, was conscious of what would 
be politically acceptable. In any event, its recommendation was implemented.11 Parallel 
developments took place in England and Wales,12 with the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility there being raised further, to ten years old, in 1963.13 There was no 
equivalent development in Scotland and it was at this time that the juvenile justice 
systems in the two jurisdictions began to diverge. 
 
The children’s hearings system was introduced in Scotland in 197114 and was based on 
the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Report of 1964.15 Fundamental to these 
                                                          
7 Hume was unwilling to elevate this idea to one of general principle irrespective of ‘how deliberate soever 
the wickedness, or how incorrigible the obstinacy, or how cunning the malice of the offender’: Hume, note 
6, above, i, 34.  
8 ‘Leniency’ too must be understood in the context of the time and Hume, note 6, above, 32–34, includes 
the following examples: Duff and Millar, March 1701 (two boys aged 14 and 12, convicted of 
housebreaking along with an adult, were sentenced to be scourged at the gibbet while the adult was 
sentenced to death); Alexander Livingston, 1749 (a 12-year-old boy convicted of killing another boy by 
stabbing him was sentenced to transportation); and Mair and Atchieson 25 March 1818 (two boys of 15 
who were convicted of housebreaking and sentenced to death had their sentences reduced to 
transportation).   
9 Report of the Departmental Committee on Protection and Training (HMSO, 1928) (Morton Committee).  
10 Ibid, 48.   
11 Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1932, s 14. 
12 Report on the Treatment of Young Offenders (Molony Committee), Cmnd 2831, 1927, leading to the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1932, s 19. 
13 Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s 16. 
14 Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. A brief explanation of the system can be found in Elaine E 
Sutherland, Family Law Basics (3rd edn, W Green, Edinburgh 2014), chapter 7. For a more detailed 
treatment, see Kenneth McK Norrie, Children’s Hearings (3rd edn, W Green, Edinburgh 2013). 
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recommendations was a belief that the needs of children who offended were much the 
same as those of abused or neglected children since, in each case, ‘the normal up-
bringing process’ had ‘fallen short’.16 Thus, it was appropriate to deal with them in the 
same tribunal. A second strand of the Kilbrandon philosophy was that, while courts were 
the appropriate place to determine disputed facts, decisions about what should happen 
to the child, thereafter, could be dealt with by panels of trained lay people. In all of this, 
the goal of the hearings system was (and remains) to find a positive way forward on the 
basis that the child's welfare is the paramount consideration.17 
 
In contrast to the adult criminal justice system, the Kilbrandon approach to juvenile 
offenders prioritised prevention, education and treatment and that goes a long way to 
explaining the Committee’s views on the age of criminal responsibility.18  It emphasised 
the function of the minimum age, in the past, as a device that protected the young from 
harsh punishment, including the death penalty. However, if offenders were to be treated 
rather than punished, then the whole notion of criminal responsibility became less 
important.19 The Committee was also troubled by the lack of scientific evidence on when 
responsibility could be ascribed to the young.20 All of that led it to conclude that ‘“the age 
of criminal responsibility” is largely a meaningless term.’21  
 
Like all such exercises, the Kilbrandon Report was a product of its time. While the 
‘treatment’ or ‘welfare’ model of juvenile justice has been subject to later criticism,22 it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons, Scotland, Cmnd 2306, 1964 (Kilbrandon 
Committee), known as the ‘Kilbrandon Report’ or simply ‘Kilbrandon’. 
16 Kilbrandon Report, para 15. 
17 The hearings system is now governed by the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 and section 25 
ascribes paramountcy to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the child throughout childhood. While 
taking account of any views the child wishes to express was always inherent in children’s hearings, the 
obligation to do so is now articulated expressly in the statute: 2011 Act, s 27.  
18 Kilbrandon Report, para 54. 
19 Ibid, para 64. 
20 Ibid, para 64. 
21 Ibid, para 65. 
22 Anthony M Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1977). For a discussion of the unfounded promises of the welfare approach, see, Gault v United 
States 387 US 1 (1976). 
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passed largely unremarked in 1960s’ Scotland.23 As we shall see, there is now solid 
neuroscientific evidence that provides valuable insights into the capacity of young people 
for impulse control and decisions-making.24 It is also worth bearing in mind that the 
Kilbrandon Committee’s deliberations took place before the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
created international obligations in terms of the minimum age of criminal responsibility.25   
 
In the event, the Kilbrandon Committee’s antipathy towards a minimum age of criminal 
responsibility had no impact. The concept remained part of Scots law, the relevant age 
continued to be eight and the distinction between civil and criminal law was retained 
within the hearings system when it came to proving the facts on which a referral was 
based. Before a child can be referred to a children’s hearing, two criteria must be 
satisfied: there must be a prima facie case indicating that the child comes within the 
scope of at least one of the 17 grounds listed in the statute26 and it must be determined 
that a compulsory supervision order is necessary.27 Most of the grounds for referring a 
child to a hearing focus on protecting children from abuse or neglect or from adults who 
may pose a threat to them, while several address behaviour by the child that is cause 
for concern.28 Where the child is 8 or older, he or she may be referred to a children’s 
hearing on the ground that ‘the child has committed an offence’.29 If the child or any of 
the ‘relevant persons’ (usually, the child’s parents) do not accept that the allegations 
supporting the ground on which the child has been referred to a hearing are true,30 the 
matter must be proven in court. Proof is on the balance of probabilities in all cases 
                                                          
23 For an early exception, see, John P Grant, ‘The Children’s Hearings System in Scotland: Its Strengths 
and Weaknesses’ (1975) 10 Irish Jurist 23. 
24 See footnotes 109-112 and the accompanying text, below. 
25 See footnotes 52-70 and the accompanying text, below. 
26 Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s 67(2).   
27 2011 Act, s 66(2). 
28 These include: ‘the child has misused’ alcohol or drugs; ‘the child’s conduct has had, or is likely to 
have, a serious adverse effect on the health, safety or development of the child or another person’; ‘the 
child is beyond the control of a relevant person’ (usually, a parent); and ‘the child has failed without a 
reasonable excuse to attend at school regularly’. 
29 2011 Act, s 67(2)(j). 
30 While legal aid is available to children in limited circumstances, most children are not represented at 
hearings and it is not known how often a child accepts the grounds for any number of very poor reasons: 
to please the panel members, to please his or her parents or simply to get the whole thing over with. 
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except for the offence ground, when proof beyond reasonable doubt is required, as is 
the norm in criminal cases in Scotland.31   
 
The minimum age of criminal responsibility was not revisited until after the creation of 
the Scottish Parliament32 when an advisory group established to examine the matter 
recommended raising the age to 12.33 The timing of that recommendation could not 
have been worse since it coincided with the emergence of a ‘tough on crime’ agenda 
throughout the United Kingdom and further afield. In the United States, an increase in 
juvenile crime during the 1980s and a series of highly-publicised school shootings 
prompted John DiIulio to introduce the world to the notion of the ‘juvenile super-
predator’.34 The 1993 murder of James Bulger by two 10 year-olds, in England, had a 
significant impact on public perceptions of juvenile offending throughout the United 
Kingdom.35 The dominant thinking is indicated by the title of the Home Office report that 
heralded the abolition of the doli incapax presumption in England and Wales:36 No More 
Excuses: A New Approach To Tackling Youth Crime In England And Wales.37 
 
                                                          
31 2011 Act, s 101(3). 
32 Scotland Act 1998. 
33 Report of Advisory Group on Youth Crime (Scottish Executive, Edinburgh 2000). 
34 John J. DiIulio, Jr, ‘The Coming of the Superpredators’, The Weekly Standard (Washington, DC, 27 
November 1995) 24: ‘On the horizon…are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile 
super-predators. They are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for 
the most trivial reasons…They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment. They live by 
the meanest code of the meanest streets, a code that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-
trigger mentality.’ He later expressed regret over his predictions and their impact: Elizabeth Becker, ‘As 
Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets’ New York Times (9 February 2001). 
35 Thomas Crofts, ‘Catching up with Europe: Taking the age of criminal responsibility seriously in 
England. European Journal of Crime’ (2009) 17(4) Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 267, 274; Enys 
Delmage, ‘The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Medico- Legal Perspective’ (2013) 13(2) Youth 
Justice 102, at 103; Heather Keating, ‘The “responsibility’ of children in the criminal law’ (2007) 19(2) 
Child & Family Law Quarterly 183, 198; Alex Newbury, ‘Very Young offenders and the criminal justice 
system: are we asking the right questions?’ (2011) 23(1) Child and Family Law Quarterly 94, 94. 
36 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 34. The presumption placed the burden on the prosecution to prove 
that a young person between the ages of 10 (the minimum age of criminal responsibility) and 14 
understood the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offence. 
37 White Paper, Cm 3809, 1997. 
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The rhetoric in Scotland was similar and, while the children’s hearings system remained 
intact, mandatory parenting classes and anti-social behaviour orders were introduced.38 
The political climate was simply not conducive to raising the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility and the Labour administration of the day diverted calls to implement the 
recommendation of the advisory group it had established by referring the matter to the 
Scottish Law Commission. The Commission attributed two distinct meanings to the term 
‘minimum age of criminal responsibility’. The first meaning – and it must be said the way 
the term was at the time and remains generally understood in Scotland39 – denotes the 
age below which a child could not be regarded as capable of offending.  The second 
meaning – and the one the Commission preferred – is the age below which a child is 
immune from prosecution in a criminal court.40  
 
Having shifted the focus from capacity to process, the Commission made only passing 
reference to the emerging scientific evidence, indicating that it was ‘not in any sense 
making any judgment on the validity or importance of work done by experts in the field of 
child development and educational psychology.’41 It recommended that, ‘any rule 
(whether at common law or statutory) on the age at which children cannot be found guilty 
of an offence should be abolished’42 and that children below the age of 12 should be 
exempt from prosecution, with it being competent to refer their cases to a children’s 
hearing instead.43  
 
Meanwhile, a group of respected scholars produced A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland, 
which contained the provision, ‘A person is not guilty of an offence by reason of anything 
                                                          
38 Claire McDiarmid, ‘Juvenile Offending: Welfare or Toughness’ in Elaine E Sutherland, Kay E Goodall, 
Gavin FM Little and Fraser P Davidson, Law Making and the Scottish Parliament: The Early Years 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2011).   
39 Gerald H Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (Michael GA Christie (ed), 3rd edn W Green, 
Edinburgh 2000), para 8.28: a ‘person under the age of criminal responsibility cannot commit any 
offence.’ 
40 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on the Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com, 
Disc Paper No 115, 2001), para 2.2.   
41 Ibid, para 3.27.   
42 Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com No 185, 2002), 
Rec 1. 
43 Ibid, Recs 2 and 3. 
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done when the person is or was a child under twelve years of age.’44 In the commentary 
portion of the Draft Code, they explain that this ‘is a matter of criminal responsibility 
rather than just a matter of temporary protection from prosecution.’45 
 
In the event, the legislation that emerged favoured the Commission’s position, but did not 
follow its recommendations in full. First, the minimum age of criminal responsibility was 
not abolished and remains 8 years old.46 Secondly, while statute now prohibits the 
prosecution of anyone below the age of 12, it makes clear (unlike the Commission’s 
version and taking the views of the drafters of the Code on board) that a person may not 
be prosecuted in respect of anything done before reaching that age.47 Thus, a 
prosecutor cannot simply wait until the child’s twelfth birthday then prosecute him or her 
for something that the child did as a ten year-old.   
  
Lobbying for reform of the minimum age of criminal responsibility continued, with the 
issue being raised during the passage of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 
and the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 – all to no effect. That, then, is 
the background: a catalogue of varied approaches to the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility in Scotland with recommendations for reform being largely ignored by 
legislators.   
 
There was another moment of false hope when a Liberal-Democrat Member of the 
Scottish Parliament proposed an amendment to what became the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 2016 that would have raised the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
to 12.48 The amendment failed but, with an election in prospect, the majority Scottish 
Nationalist Party administration was keen to demonstrate that it was ‘listening’ and it set 
                                                          
44 Eric Clive, Pamela Fergusson, Christopher Gane and Alexander McCall Smith, A Draft Criminal Code 
for Scotland with Commentary (Scottish Law Commission, Edinburgh 2003), s 15. 
45 Ibid, 42. 
46 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 41. 
47 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 41A, added by the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) 
Act 2010, s 52(2). 
48 Elaine E Sutherland, ‘Time to raise the age of criminal responsibility’, Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland online, uploaded 14 September 2015: http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/60-
9/1020694.aspx  
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up another advisory group to review the matter. That advisory group, like its 2000 
predecessor, recommended raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 12.49  
 
At the time of writing, the SNP administration (now, a minority government) has just 
completed a public consultation on the recommendation.50 The Faculty of Advocates 
and the Law Society of Scotland, representing the two branches of the legal profession 
in Scotland, have expressed their support for raising the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility in Scotland to 12, as have numerous children’s rights groups and 
academics.51 Thus, the stage is set, once again, for legislation to implement the 
recommendation. The desirability of this course of action becomes all the more 
apparent when one examines the international norms, comparative position and 
scholarly research on the issue. 
  
International norms and the comparative position 
  
The last thirty years have seen enormous strides in international recognition of the 
special position of children and of their rights. Numerous international and regional 
instruments address juvenile justice, often dealing expressly with the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility,52  and a number of instruments are of particular significance in 
Scotland.   
  
While the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights53 does not mandate the 
provision of a minimum age of criminal responsibility, its monitoring body, the Human 
                                                          
49 The Report of the Advisory Group on the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility, note 3, above, 11. 
50 Consultation on the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2016): 
https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/youth-justice/minimum-age-of-criminal-responsibility  
51 At the time of writing, the responses are available only in anonymised, uncollated form: 
https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/youth-justice/minimum-age-of-criminal-responsibility The response of the 
Faculty of Advocates can be found on its website: http://www.advocates.org.uk/news-and-
responses/responses/2016/jun/the-minimum-age-of-criminal-responsibility, with that of the Law Society of 
Scotland being on its website: https://www.lawscot.org.uk/media/860539/crim-fam-minimum-age-of-
criminal-responsibility-consultation-response-final-.pdf  
52 For a discussion of the various instruments, see, Cipriani, Children's Rights and the Minimum Age of 
Criminal Responsibility, note 1, above, chapter 3. 
53 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976. 
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Rights Committee, proceeds on the basis that such an obligation exists. Thus, in its 
most recent Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, it criticised the low age 
throughout the country, mentioning Scotland expressly, and urged raising the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility ‘in accordance with international standards and ensure the 
full implementation of international standards for juvenile justice.’54 
 
As might be expected, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child55 
addresses the minimum age of criminal responsibility, but it is rather less directive on 
this issue than it is on many others. In contrast to numerous articles providing that 
‘States Parties shall [do X]’, Article 40(3) is in the following terms: 
States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, 
procedures, authorities and institutions specifically applicable to 
children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed 
the penal law, and, in particular: 
(a) the establishment of a minimum age below which children 
shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the 
penal law.56 
 
The explanation for this rather insipid provision lies in its history. While juvenile justice 
was discussed early on during the 10-year process of drafting the Convention, there 
was initially no mention of a minimum age of criminal responsibility.57 It was not until the 
Technical Review, in 1988, that the issue was addressed at all when the Centre for 
Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs called for a number of provisions 
contained in the Beijing Rules,58 adopted only three years earlier at the Seventh United 
                                                          
54 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7, 17 August 2015, para 23. 
55 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3, adopted 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990. 
56 Emphasis added. 
57 Save the Children Sweden and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, New York and Geneva 2007) Vol II, 738-774. What became Articles 37 and 40 started life 
as a single article, initially Article 20, then Article 19, being bifurcated during the Second Reading stage.  
58 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, A/RES/40/33, 29 
November 1985, known as the ‘Beijing Rules’. 
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Nations Congress, to be incorporated.59  Thereafter, the rather equivocal and lacklustre 
text of Rule 4.160 of the Beijing Rules was used in the Convention deliberations and 
Article 40 continues its failure to provide for a specific minimum age of criminal 
responsibility.    
 
In contrast to the drafters of the Convention, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
has taken a more focused and directive approach to the matter. After an abortive 
attempt in 2002, it produced General Comment No 10: Children’s Rights and Juvenile 
Justice,61 in 2007, where it noted the varied approach of States Parties to the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility. However, it made its own position abundantly clear when 
it described the ages as ranging ‘from a very low level of age 7 or 8 to the commendably 
high level of 14 or 16’62 and found that setting the age below 12 ‘not to be internationally 
acceptable’.63 Each of the Concluding Observation on the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland that preceded General Comment No 10 and those that came later have 
criticised the low age of criminal responsibility throughout the country,64 with the UN 
Committee indicating, yet again, in 2016, that it was ‘concerned’ that the ‘minimum age 
of criminal responsibility remains 8 years of age in Scotland.’65 
  
Given its vintage and history, it is not surprising to find that the European Convention on 
Human Rights makes no express reference to juvenile offenders, far less to a minimum 
                                                          
59 In its submission, the Centre’s Social Development Division reminded the drafters that ‘it should be 
clearly stated that there should be no criminal responsibility of children until they reach a certain age’: 
Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, note 57, above, Vol II, 753. The Centre’s 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch submitted a length note referencing the Beijing Rules  and 
repeated the need for a minimum age of criminal responsibility: ibid, Vol II, 759. 
60 Rule 4.1 provides, ‘In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility 
for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts 
of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.’ 
61 CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007. 
62 Ibid, para.30 (emphasis added).   
63 Ibid, para.32.    
64 Concluding Observation on the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, 15 February 1995, 
CRC/C/15/Add 34, paras 40-43; Concluding Observation on the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, 9 
October 2002, CRC/C/15/Add.188, paras 59 and 62; Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CCR/C/GBR/CO/4, 3 
October 2008, para 78.  
65 Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, 3 June 2016, para 77(a). 
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age of criminal responsibility. However, the European Court has made a significant 
contribution on the issue of age in the context of the fair hearing requirements of Article 
6. In T v United Kingdom and V v United Kingdom66 it considered the trial, in England, of 
Robert Thomson and Jon Venables who, it will be remembered, were ten years old 
when they killed 2 year-old James Bulger. Special arrangements, designed to 
accommodate their youth, were made at the trial and they were legally represented. 
However, the European Court concluded that, by virtue of their ages and states of mind, 
they were unable to participate effectively in the proceedings and, thus, had been 
denied the right to a fair hearing, in breach of Article 6(1).67 Similarly, in SC v United 
Kingdom,68 the European Court concluded that an 11 year-old with a mental age of a 6-
8 years old was unable to follow, or participate effectively in, his trial and, again, it found 
a breach of Article 6(1).  
 
The direction of international norms is clear: 12 is the minimum acceptable age at which 
to start attributing criminal responsibility. How, then, are other countries responding to 
these norms? International comparisons must be approached with a degree of caution, 
not least due to differences in terminology and the fact that the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility is only one part of the overall approach to juvenile justice.  Nonetheless, 
insights can be gleaned from Don Cipriani’s much-cited review of the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility in over 200 countries around the world.69 Published in 2009, his 
research revealed that some 23 countries had no stated minimum age of criminal 
responsibility, with the median age being 12 years old.70 European counties tend to 
favour 13 or 14, while the Scandinavian norm is 15. 
 
The comparative picture is not static and the Child Rights International Network71 
reports that a small number of states have lowered the minimum age of criminal 
                                                          
66 (2000) 30 EHRR 121.   
67 Ibid, para 89. 
68 (2005) 40 EHRR 10. 
69 Cipriani, Children's Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility, note 1, above, xiii. 
70 Ibid, 109. As Cipriani points out, the average age of 10 is not as useful a measure because the 
calculation is skewed by having to attribute 0 to the 23 countries with no stated age.  
71 For updated information, see the Child Rights International Network website, Minimum Ages Of 
Criminal Responsibility Around The World: https://www.crin.org/en/home/ages 
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responsibility over the last few years or are considering doing so, albeit in no case was 
it actually reduced to below 12.72 It is heartening to see, then, that a recent expert 
review of the most pressing issues facing vulnerable young people in New Zealand, 
commissioned by the Minister for Social Development, recommended raising the age of 
criminal responsibility from 10 to 12.73 By any measure, having eight as the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility does not sit well alongside international and comparative 
norms.  
 
When do children acquire the capacity to offend? 
  
The emergence and development of international norms on juvenile justice have 
coincided with – and, undoubtedly, have prompted – an increase in research and 
publication in the field and scholars make frequent reference to these international 
efforts. While there have long been calls to raise the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility, the last two decades have witnessed a wealth of scholarly literature on 
the subject. It will be recalled that the Scottish Law Commission offered two 
interpretations of the term, distinguishing the age at which the capacity to form the 
necessary intention to offend is attributed to a child from the age below which the child 
is immune from prosecution. Most academics focus on the capacity of children and 
young people and the vast majority of academics who have contributed to the debate, 
both in Scotland and abroad, support a minimum age of criminal responsibility 
significantly higher than 8 years old.   
 
Two elements must be present for the commission of a crime:  the actor must form the 
requisite intention – the mens rea – and that must be accompanied by an act – the 
actus reus – prohibited by the criminal law. Forming the requisite intention requires the 
capacity to understand the wrongfulness and criminality of the act, combined with a 
meaningful opportunity and the ability to make choices.  
                                                          
72 Child Rights International Network, States Lowering the Age of Criminal Responsibility: 
https://www.crin.org/en/library/publications/juvenile-justice-states-lowering-minimum-age-criminal-
responsibility  
73 Expert Panel Final Report: Investing in New Zealand’s Children and their Families (Rebstock Report) 
(Ministry of Social Development, Wellington 2016), Recc 60(g).  





Turning first to understanding the wrongfulness of the act, it is accepted that babes in 
arms have insufficient understanding to form the requisite intention. Thereafter, at what 
point in the maturation process do children acquire the necessary comprehension? That 
is a complex question and Claire McDiarmid summarises the various elements as 
including knowledge of the difference between right and wrong and that the particular 
act in question is wrong; understanding that it is criminal and what that means; and the 
ability to place the act in a moral context.74 
 
One way to evaluate a child’s comprehension of these various facets is by means of an 
individual assessment. Indeed, there is a fundamental flaw in using a fixed age to 
determine capacity across the board since children and young mature at different rates 
as a result of a host of genetic and environmental factors. On that basis, any blanket 
age, whether in the civil or criminal context, can be no more than an approximate – and, 
sometimes, inaccurate – cypher for meaningful assessment of actual capacity. A 
number of commentators resist having a fixed age of criminal responsibility for this 
reason and view a binary notion of capacity – one either has it or one does not – as an 
over-simplification that fails to embrace the evolving capacity of children.75 
Individualised assessment is time-consuming and, thus, costly, and the attraction of a 
fixed age limit lies in it being cheap and administratively convenient. The potential for 
injustice is reduced if, as in Scottish criminal cases, it is open to the defence to show 
                                                          
74 Claire McDiarmid, ‘An Age of Complexity: Children and Criminal Responsibility in Law’ (2013) 13(2) 
Youth Justice 145, 152. 
75 Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Protection for children before the law: An empirical analysis of the age of criminal 
responsibility, the abolition of doli incapax and the merits of a developmental immaturity defence in 
England and Wales’ (2016) 16 Criminology and Criminal Justice, first published online on February 22, 
2016 as doi:10.1177/1748895816632579. See also, the ‘capabilities approach’ developed in Rosalind 
Dixon and Martha Nussbaum, ‘Children’s Rights and the Capability Approach: the Question of Special 
Priority’ 97 Cornell Law Review 549 (2011-2012). See further, Kathryn Hollingsworth, ‘Theorising 
Children’s Rights in Youth Justice: The Significance of Autonomy and Foundational Rights’ (2013) 76(6) 
Modern Law Review 1046; Noam Peleg, ‘Reconceptualising the Child's Right to Development: Children 
and the Capability Approach’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Children's Rights 523; Dawn Watkins, 
‘Where do I stand? Assessing children’s capacities under English Law’ (2016) 28(1) Child and Family 
Law 25. 
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that, despite having reached the benchmark age, the child did not in fact have the 
requisite capacity to understand.76  
 
At the heart of calls to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility beyond 8 (or 10) 
years old lies the belief that children of that age simply do not understand the requisite 
elements of criminal activity sufficiently well for criminal responsibility to be attributed to 
them.77 Research by Glen Smith and Nick Winkfield concluded that, ‘By the age of 
seven years, children able to distinguish between right and wrong and seem to be 
aware of the criminal implications of their behaviour’.’78 Unfortunately, the only report of 
the research on which these conclusions are based is described as a ‘Summary’ and, 
while it indicates that the findings resulted from an online, nationally representative, 
qualitative survey of 750 7-16 year-olds, there is little further information about the 
research methodology.  In particular, the questions put to the children and young people 
are not disclosed. Distinguishing between right and wrong could mean appreciating, as 
one would expect of a seven year-old, that certain behaviour meets with adult 
disapproval, but that could include anything from ‘naughtiness’ (being cheeky, telling 
fibs) to conduct that is actually criminal (stealing, killing and the like). That children 
‘seem to be aware’ of the criminal implications of conduct is somewhat vague and, 
again, no information is provided about the depth or range of their comprehension. 
Thus, it would be a mistake to attach any great weight to this study. 
 
The legal system’s use of age limits is not confined to the criminal arena and many 
scholars point to the glaring inconsistency between the legal systems attribution of 
criminal responsibility at an early age its recognition of the child’s capacity as an actor 
                                                          
76 The press reported a Scottish case where the prosecutor decided not to proceed where the evidence 
demonstrated that an 11 year-old boy, originally charged with attempted murder, had a mental age below 
8: Shirley English, ‘Attempted murder dropped against retarded boy, 11’ The Times (London, 22 January 
2001).  
77 McDiarmid, ‘An Age of Complexity’, note 74, above; Catherine Elliot, ‘Criminal Responsibility and 
Children: a new defence required to acknowledge the absence of capacity and choice’ (2011) 74 (4) 
Journal of Criminal Law 289, 308. 
78 Glen Smith and Nick Winkfield, The development of the moral compass: A study among children aged 
7 to 16 in the UK (Youth Research Forum, Surrey 2011), para 2.3.1. The same research found that ‘as 
they get older they become more thoughtful and nuanced in their attitudes to moral questions.’ 
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or participant in other areas of the law.79 Heather Keating juxtaposes the capacity to 
consent to medical treatment and to participate in decision-making in the family law 
context, in England and Wales,80 with criminal responsibility, while Barry Goldson 
highlights the absurdity of regarding a child under 12 as too young to buy an animal 
companion, yet holding him or her criminally responsible.81  
 
In Scotland, there are numerous inconsistent, age-related restrictions on accessing 
such rights and privileges as voting (16/18 years old),82 serving on a jury (18),83 
marrying or registering a civil partnership (16)84 and driving a motor vehicle (16/17/18).85 
The function of many age limits, like those on access to alcohol (18)86 and gambling 
(16/18),87 is primarily protective. The trend with such protective regulation has been to 
increase the age limit, as occurred in respect of tobacco products when the age was 
raised from 16 to 18,88 or to introduce new restrictions, like those on using tanning 
salons.89 As is often the case with statutory age limits, they vary, but the striking 
similarity between them is that they are significantly higher than 8 years old, the age of 
criminal responsibility. If the legal system regards children below the age of 16, 17 or 18 
are too immature to exercise the judgment necessary to participate in the various 
                                                          
79 Delmage, ‘The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility’, note 35, above; Elliot, ‘Criminal Responsibility 
and Children, note 77, above’; Watkins, ‘Where do I stand?’, note 75, above. 
80 Keating, ‘The “responsibility” of children in the criminal law’, note 35, above.   
81 Barry Goldson, ‘“Unsafe, Unjust and Harmful to Wider Society”: Grounds for Raising the Minimum Age 
of Criminal Responsibility in England and Wales’ (2013) Youth Justice 13(2) 111, 120.    
82 Voters in Westminster elections must be 18 years old: Representation of the People Act 1983, s 1. 
Sixteen year-olds were first enfranchised across Scotland for the Scottish independence referendum: 
Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013, s 2. They can now vote in elections to the 
Scottish Parliament and local authority elections: Scotland Act 1998, s 11 and the Scottish Local 
Government Elections Order 2011, SSI 2011/399, as amended most recently by the Scottish Local 
Government Elections Order 2016, SSI 2016/7.   
83 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980, s 1. 
84 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s 1 and Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 86, respectively. 
85 Road Traffic Act 1988, s 101, with the minimum age depending on the type of vehicle. 
86 Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976, s 68. 
87 The age is generally 18, save when it comes to state-sanctioned gambling, with the age for 
participating in the National Lottery being 16: Betting Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, s 21, the National 
Lottery etc. Act 1993, s 12 and SI 1994/189. 
88 Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, s 18, as amended by the Smoking, Health and 
Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005 (Variation of age limit for the sale of tobacco purchase and 
consequential modifications) Order 2007, SSI 2007/437. 
89 Public Health, etc. (Scotland) Act 2008, ss 95-96. 
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activities or be exposed to particular dangers, how can it justify holding them criminally 
responsible? 
  
This argument should be advanced with a degree of caution, particularly in the political 
arena, since it can be something of a double-edged sword. It could all too easily be 
employed to support the removal from children and young people of powers they have, 
undermining their human rights.90 Conversely, demonstrating children’s participatory 
capacity in the civil arena, particularly in Scotland where there is a very real attempt to 
embrace it, could be used to support a low minimum age of criminal responsibility. If 
children are capable of participating in decision-making from a young age, so the 
argument might go, then they can be held accountable in the criminal arena too.  
 
However, a quick trip through ‘CRC 101’ and the relevant Scots law exposes any such 
argument for the fallacy that it is. At the heart of the Convention lies recognition of both 
the responsibility of the state and the adult world to protect children and young people 
and of their right to have their views taken into account. Article 3 prioritises the best 
interests of children, while Article 12 guarantees their participation rights, and both 
principles underpin the Convention as a whole. This is entirely consistent with the notion 
of the child’s evolving capacity as articulated in Article 5.  
 
Scots law provides a good example of real attempts to embrace these principles in the 
civil arena. Thus, those making decisions about children within the family,91  in the chid 
protection context92 and in the courts93 are required to give the child the opportunity to 
express his or views and to take account of these views in the light of the child’s age 
and maturity. There is no minimum age for the exercise of participation rights, albeit a 
child of 12 is presumed to have the requisite capacity to form a view.94 Similarly, 
children can consent to medical treatment or instruct a solicitor where the relevant 
                                                          
90 Goldson, ‘“Unsafe, Unjust and Harmful to Wider Society”’, note 81, above, 117.    
91 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 6. 
92 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 16(2) and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s 27. 
93 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(7)(b). 
94 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(10) and 16(2) and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s 
27(4). 
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professional determines that the child understands what is involved.95 The point is that 
children’s agency is recognised in all of these situations, but they are not left wholly to 
their own devices since the safety net of adult involvement is there to mediate the final 
decision on the basis of the welfare principle.96 
  
The opportunity and ability to make choices 
  
Forming criminal intent is not confined to comprehension since the actor must not only 
understand the nature of the conduct, he or she must also choose to act in a particular 
way. Inherent in that process is having the opportunity to make choices and the ability to 
exercise judgment. Children are impeded in their ability to make meaningful choices by 
their very position as children. They are subject to parental and other authority and have 
little control over their environment.97 There is an abundance of evidence demonstrating 
the nexus between offending, on the one hand, and neglect, deprivation and truancy, on 
the other and the impact of these environmental factors can only undermine the child’s 
autonomy. 98   
 
Ever since the (then) Minister for Children and Young People, Aileen Campbell, first 
expressed the Scottish Government’s ‘ambition to make Scotland the best place in the 
world to grow up in’,99 it has become a stock phrase in all government publications 
dealing with children. However, that laudable ambition is far from being realised for 
many children in Scotland. Poverty remains a significant problem.100 According to the 
                                                          
95 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 2(4). 
96 The empowerment of children is arguably even greater in the context of adoption where a child of 12 or 
over can consent to, or veto, his or her own adoption, the child’s consent not being subject to the power 
of the court to dispense with it as it can in respect of parental consent: Adoption and Children (Scotland) 
Act 2007, s 32. Again, however, the court applies the welfare principle in approving adoptions.   
97 Watkins, ‘Where do I stand? Assessing children’s capacities under English Law’, note 75, above, 27. 
98  Raymond Arthur, ‘Rethinking the Criminal Responsibility of Young People in England and Wales’ 
(2012) 20(1) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 13, 17-21; Elliot, ‘Criminal 
Responsibility and Children’, note 77, above, 297.  
99 Official Report, Education and Culture Committee, 8 October 2013, col 2944, at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=8550&mode=pdf .  
100 Peter Kenway, Sabrina Busche, Adam Tinson and Theo Barry Born, Monitoring Poverty and Social 
Exclusion in Scotland 2015 (Joseph Rowntree Trust, York 2015); Jim McCormick, A Review of Devolved 
Approaches to Child Poverty (Joseph Rowntree Trust, York 2013). See also the Child Poverty Action 
Group in Scotland website: http://www.cpag.org.uk/scotland  
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government’s most recent figures, in 2014-15, 22% (220,000) of Scotland’s children 
were living in relative poverty101 and there are similarly disturbing statistics on children 
affected by homelessness102 and food insecurity. 103 As at 31 July 2015, 15,404 children 
were classified as ‘looked after’, meaning that their care was subject to formal state 
oversight.104 While some 60% of these children were living with their parents, other 
family members or friends, the remainder were in foster care or residential care. 
Deprivation impacts overall wellbeing and leads to social exclusion, poorer academic 
achievement,105 particularly for looked after children,106 and a sense of hopelessness 
amongst impoverished young people.107 Thus, it is illusory to suggest that these 
children have the opportunity to make meaningful choices. 
  
What of the ability to exercise choice? Thomas Crofts analysed this decision-making 
process in terms of what he called the ‘cognitive element’, understanding the rules and 
the consequences of particular acts, and the ‘volitional element’, the ability to control 
one’s actions.108 Enormous advances have been made by the neuroscientific 
community in understanding brain development, particularly in children and young 
                                                          
101 Poverty and Income Inequality in Scotland: 2014/15 (Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2016), 2. 
102 In 2015-16, while the overall number of people experiencing homelessness decreased, the number of 
households with children living in temporary accommodation rose by 8% (209 households), with the 
number of children affected increasing by 13% (591 children): Homelessness in Scotland 2015-2016 
(Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2016). 
103 Filip Sosenko, Nicola Livingstone and Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Overview of Food Provision in Scotland 
(Scottish Government Social Research, Edinburgh, 2013). 
104 Children's Social Work Statistics Scotland 2014/15 (Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2016). 
105 Edward Sosu and Sue Ellis, Closing the attainment gap in Scottish education (Joseph Rowntree Trust, 
York 2013), reporting that the gap between children from low-income and high-income households starts 
early and persists throughout childhood.   
106 While the position has improved somewhat over the last five years, ‘looked after children’ (those under 
state jurisdiction) perform less well in education, are excluded from school more often (218 v 27 per 
1,000) and are less likely to have a positive destination nine months after leaving school (72% v 92%) 
than pupils overall: Education Outcomes for Looked After Children 2014/15 (Scottish Government, 
Edinburgh 2016). 
107 A report, based on interviews with 2,311 16-to-24-year-olds from across the UK, found that 25% of 
those from deprived homes believe that 'few' or 'none' of their career goals to be achievable, compared to 
7% of those from affluent families; one quarter of young people from poor homes (26%) felt that ‘people 
like them don’t succeed in life’; and young people growing up in poverty are significantly less likely to 
imagine themselves buying a nice house or even finding a job in the future. See, Broke, not broken (The 
Prince’s Trust and RBS, Edinburgh, 2011).  
108 Thomas Crofts, ‘Catching up with Europe’ (2009) 17 (4) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & 
Criminal Justice 267, 286. 
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people, and its impact on the decision-making process. In 2006, the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists reported:  
Biological factors such as the functioning of the frontal lobes of the 
brain play an important role in the development of self-control and of 
other abilities. The frontal lobes are involved in an individual's ability to 
manage the large amount of information entering consciousness from 
many sources, in changing behaviour, in using acquired information, in 
planning actions and in controlling impulsivity. Generally the frontal 
lobes are felt to mature at approximately 14 years of age.109 
 
A few years later, as part of an initiative to promote understanding of developments in 
neuroscience and their implications for society and public policy, the Royal Society 
published a number of well-referenced and accessible reports, including one dealing 
with Neuroscience and the law. While warning that there is ‘huge individual variability in 
the timing and pattern of brain development,’ it reported that changes in important 
neural circuits underpinning behaviour continue until at least the age of 20.110 
Furthermore, rates of development for different regions of the brain impact the ability to 
moderate and regulate behaviour and ‘may account for heightened emotional 
responses and the risky behaviour characteristic of adolescence.’111 Addressing the age 
of criminal responsibility in England and Wales, the Royal Society noted that, at the age 
of ten, the brain is developmentally immature and continues to undergo important 
changes linked to the regulation of behaviour, concluding that, from a neuroscientific 
perspective, with regard to criminal responsibility, an arbitrary cut off age may not be 
justifiable.112 
  
                                                          
109 Royal College of Psychiatrists, Child Defendants, Occasional Paper 56 (London: Royal College of 
Psychiatrists 2006), 38. 
110 Brainwaves 4: Neuroscience and the Law (The Royal Society, London 2012), 13, available at: 
https://royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/brain-waves/Brain-Waves-4.pdf  
111 Ibid, 14. In terms of different regions of the brain developing at different times, it explained, ‘The 
prefrontal cortex (which is especially important in relation to judgement, decision-making and impulse 
control) is the slowest to mature. By contrast, the amygdala, an area of the brain responsible for reward 
and emotional processing, develops during early adolescence.’ 
112 Ibid, 14. 
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In contrast to the scientific evidence, there is the realm of ‘what everyone knows’. There 
is a view, in some quarters, that children are more mature now than in times past and 
that the minimum age of criminal responsibility should reflect the maturity of these savvy 
youngsters. This (mis)perception contributed to the abolition of the doli incapax 
presumption in England and Wales,113 and played into the Scottish Law Commission 
recommendations, in 2001.114 Most scholars refute this assertion115 and something of a 
lone voice amongst academics (but, sadly, not politicians and sections of the media) is 
that of Gerry Maher. It is worth remembering that he was a Commissioner at the 
Scottish Law Commission when it recommended abandoning the concept of a minimum 
age criminal responsibility altogether, and his words echo the position taken there: 
essentially, that because children today understand technology in a way that was not 
open to children in centuries past, there may be a case for lowering the age of criminal 
responsibility.116  
 
Yet we live in a world of ‘helicopter parents’ and the sub-set, ‘tiger moms’.117 Given the 
nexus between neglect, deprivation and offending, children who engage in criminal 
conduct may be less afflicted by this modern scourge than their more affluent peers. 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to confuse access to the Internet and the attendant 
exposure to information (and misinformation) with the ability to make a considered 
judgment.118 Spending hours playing computer games and tweeting one’s latest 
thoughts and believing that ‘friends’ are people who have clicked the requisite button on 
a Facebook page will not necessarily enhance the ability to function in the real world. 
                                                          
113 No more excuses: A new approach to tackling youth crime in England and Wales (London: Home 
Office 1997). 
114 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on the Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com, 
Disc Paper No 115, 2001), para 3.27: ‘It could therefore be argued that there is a case for lowering the 
age of criminal responsibility to reflect the earlier maturity and understanding of children today as 
compared with children in 1932 [when the age was raised from 7 to 8]’. 
115 Arthur, ‘Rethinking the Criminal Responsibility of Young People in England and Wales’, note 98, 
above, 17-19; Keating, ‘The ‘responsibility’ of children in the criminal law’, note 35, above, 195. 
116  Gerry Maher, ‘Age and Criminal Responsibility’ 2 Ohio State Journal on Criminal Law 493 (2004-
2005), 496. Compare with footnote 114, above. 
117 David Pimentel, ‘Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”: Is Overprotective Parenting the 
New Standard of care?’ 2012 Utah Law Review 947. 
118 June Ahn, ‘The Effect of Social Network Sites on Adolescents’ Social and Academic Development: 
Current Theories and Controversies’ (2011) 62(8) Journal of the Association for Information Science & 
Technology 1435.  
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More significantly, perhaps, ‘what everyone knows’ hardly compares with the 




Raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 12 would be a welcome step, of 
course, but it is illusory to think that is an end of the matter because there are 
consequential challenges to be addressed. The reform, by itself, would not alter the 
conduct of children and young people and some 8-11 year olds would continue to 
engage in behaviour that was previously criminal. In Scotland, the first issue, then, is 
whether the legal system has the tools necessary to address the behaviour. Rather 
more challenging is a second issue: how this, now non-criminal, conduct should be 
treated by the state when it gathers and retains information about individuals and 
subsequently discloses that information to third parties. 
 
Supporters of raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility have never suggested 
that what was previously criminal conduct – what the 2016 advisory group called 
‘harmful behaviour’ – by 8-11 year-old should simply be ignored. Indeed, if the child’s 
actions suggest that there is cause for concern, then prioritising the child’s welfare, as 
required by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, mandates that it should be 
addressed.  
 
Given the nexus between offending, on the one hand, and neglect, deprivation and 
truancy, on the other,119 it might be expected that a child referred to a children’s hearing 
on offence grounds might just as easily be referred on care and protection or truancy 
grounds. Recent research bears out that expectation.120 A study of one hundred 8-11 
year-old alleged offenders in 2013-14 found that only 6 of the cases resulted in a 
children’s hearing. Of the six, four of the children were also referred on care and 
                                                          
119 See the discussion at footnotes 98-107 and accompanying text, above. 
120 Gillian Henderson, Indiya Kurlus and Gwen McNiven, Backgrounds and outcomes for children aged 8 
to 11 years old who have been referred to the Children’s Reporter for offending (Scottish Children’s 
Reporter Administration, Stirling 2016). 
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protection grounds, so their needs would have been addressed without the offence 
referral. Of the remaining two cases, one child denied the offence and, in the event, it 
was not established at proof. Thus, in only one case out of the 100 reviewed did the use 
of the offence ground prove crucial. Applying that result to all 215 of the 8-11 year-old 
alleged offenders identified in the same year suggests that two or three such cases 
might arise annually.121  
 
Even that figure may be an over-estimate because it is possible that the children could 
be brought to a hearing on a care and protection ground. In recommending no change 
to the grounds for referring a child to a children’s hearing, the 2016 advisory group 
highlighted two of the existing grounds that might be particularly applicable to conduct 
that is currently treated as an offence:122 that ‘the child’s conduct has had, or is likely to 
have, a serious adverse effect on the health, safety or development of the child or 
another person’ or that ‘the child is beyond the control of a relevant person’.123 
 
Was the advisory group correct in reaching this conclusion? One way to answer that 
question is by using a hypothetical example. Let us suppose that a 10 year-old child, X, 
burns down a school, causing the closure of the school and millions of pounds of 
damage. X is well cared for in a loving family and her parents had no reason to suspect 
that she would do this. While the school closure will create inconvenience and 
disadvantage to the other pupils, it is doubtful that it reaches the level of having the 
‘serious adverse effect’ on them required to satisfy that ground of referral. Unless we 
are to interpret being ‘beyond the control of a relevant person’ as applying to all 
instances of a child doing something of which her parents disapprove, that ground 
would be ruled out as well.  
 
Under the current system, X’s conduct might well be addressed by voluntary measures 
short of a referral to a children’s hearing and that could continue to be the case. 
                                                          
121 SCRA Annual Report 2014/15 (Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration, Stirling 2015). 
122 The Report of the Advisory Group on the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility, note 3, above, 
paras 23-24. 
123 Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s 67(2)(m) and (n), respectively. 
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However, what if X’s parents are not willing to co-operate with any intervention? Another 
ground of referral – that ‘the child is likely to suffer unnecessarily, or the health or 
development of the child is likely to be seriously impaired, due to a lack of parental 
care’124 – might apply. But what if the refusal of X’s parents to co-operate is due to their 
belief that, as her parents, they are better placed to handle the situation? Arguably, it 
would be dangerously intrusive to treat any parental disagreement with a course of 
action suggested by the authorities as an indicator of neglect, a point highlighted 
recently by the Supreme Court.125  What if X’s parents are willing to co-operate with 
voluntary measures, but X is not? In these circumstances, it would seem that nothing 
could be done to address the risk of X repeating her behaviour and compelling her to 
engage with intervention and support.  
 
That example suggests that there may be a gap in the grounds of referral and that some 
8-11 year-olds whose conduct would currently be treated as criminal, bringing them 
within the ambit of the hearings system, might fall through the cracks if the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility is raised to 12. Doubtless, there are other examples.126 
Happily, the problem can be remedied very easily by adding a ground along the lines 
that, ‘the child has caused serious damage to, or destruction of, property,’ something 
that does not even require legislation since it can be done by Ministerial Order.127   
 
The second issue arising from raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility – 
gathering, retention and disclosure of information – presents rather more of a challenge 
in both conceptual and practical terms. Police Scotland, the single police authority 
created for the country when the various regional forces were unified,128 gathers rather 
                                                          
124 Ibid, s 67(2)(a). 
125 Christian Institute v Scottish Ministers [2016] UKSC 51, [95]. In the context of the Named Person 
scheme, Lady Hale highlighted the risk, in individual cases, of parents being given the impression that 
they have to accept the advice or services which they are offered and that failure to co-operate will be 
regarded as evidence of risk of harm. She observed, ‘An assertion of such compulsion, whether express 
or implied, and an assessment of non-cooperation as evidence of such a risk could well amount to an 
interference with the right to respect for family life which would require justification under article 8(2).’ 
126 Since animals are treated as property, in Scotland, a child who harmed animals might, again, be 
beyond the reach of the hearings system should the child or the parents prove uncooperative.  
127 Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, s 67(4). 
128 Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012. 
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a lot of information about individuals. In addition to details of criminal convictions, it 
keeps ‘other relevant information’ and operates a Vulnerable Persons Database where 
‘concerns about vulnerable people’, including children, are recorded.   
 
After a period of time, individuals are generally freed from the obligation to disclose 
criminal convictions in job applications and the like.129 However, the Scottish rules on 
non-disclosure of past offences do not apply in all circumstances and so, for example, 
reference may be made to them in civil proceedings. In addition, disclosure may occur 
under a range of statutory schemes – basic, standard, enhanced and the various 
Protection of Vulnerable Groups schemes – run by Disclosure Scotland on behalf of the 
Scottish Ministers,130 when a person is applying for certain educational courses, 
volunteer opportunities or employment.131 For this purpose, an offence accepted or 
established in the context of a children’s hearing is treated in the same way as a 
criminal conviction. Participation in the these schemes is ‘voluntary’ in so far as the 
individual seeking to participate in a regulated activity applies to join the scheme. While 
the law governing the schemes was amended to take account of its incompatibility with 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,132 it continues be a source of 
concern, particularly in respect of past wrongdoing by young people.133  
 
In Scotland, there is no system of the kind, found in some other jurisdictions, for general 
public notification of the presence of particular kinds of offenders in the 
neighbourhood.134 However, in addition to the statutory schemes, there is an informal 
system that gives parents and guardians the opportunity to ask Police Scotland if there 
is any reason for them to be concerned about a person who has contact with their 
                                                          
129 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. 
130 See the Disclosure Scotland website: http://www.disclosurescotland.co.uk/index.htm  
131 The Protection of Vulnerable Groups (Scotland) Act 2007, s 95, defines ‘work’ very broadly. 
132 The Police Act 1997 and the Protection of Vulnerable Groups (Scotland) Act 2007 Remedial (No 2) 
Order 2015, SSI 2015/330, enacted in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in R (on the application of 
T) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police 
[2015] AC 49. 
133 R (on the application of G) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Chief Constable of 
Surrey [2016] 4 WLR 94. 
134 For the history of such laws in the United States, see, Maureen S Hopbell, ‘Balancing the Protection of 
Children Against the Protection of Constitutional Rights: the Past, Present and Future of Megan’s Law’ 42 
Duq L Rev 331 (2004). 
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child.135 Disclosure of both conviction and non-conviction information is at the discretion 
of the police and it is conceivable that information relating to an offence referral could be 
revealed.  
 
The reason for disclosure as outlined above is obvious. If a person has behaved in a 
way that endangered others, in the past, there is concern that he or she may repeat the 
conduct. To put it another way, if those working or volunteering with vulnerable people 
were not vetted in advance, there is a risk that those least able to protect themselves 
might be exposed to unsuitable or dangerous individuals. Were harm to come to a 
vulnerable person, in the absence of vetting, there would be a public outcry. Yet the 
whole disclosure process is premised on the notion of ‘once bad, always bad’. Quite 
apart from the danger of errors in gathering (particularly non-conviction) information, the 
potential for disclosure of past criminality has serious implications for compliance with 
the requirement of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child that 
measures for dealing with children who offend should take into account the desirability 
of promoting their reintegration into society.136 
 
Of particular relevance for our present purpose is how information about harmful 
behaviour by 8-11 year-olds will be treated in the future if the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility is raised to 12.137 In the context of ensuring that the child receives the 
necessary intervention and support, it was clear that there was no question of simply 
ignoring such behaviour. Should the same principle apply to information-gathering and 
disclosure? On the one hand, this would run counter to the whole notion that the child 
lacks the capacity to be held criminally responsible and disclosure could only obstruct 
the young person in securing future educational opportunities or employment, impeding 
                                                          
135 Keeping Children Safe: information disclosure about child sex offenders (Scottish Government, 
Edinburgh 2015). See further, Sex Offender Community Disclosure Scheme: 
http://www.scotland.police.uk/keep-safe/young-people/supporting-children-and-young-people/child-
protection-keeping-children-safe/  
136 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art 40(1).   
137 Parallel questions arise in respect of the taking and retention of forensic samples from 8-11 year-olds 
and these were addressed by the 2016 advisory group: The Report of the Advisory Group on the 
Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility, note 3, above, 32-35. 
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his or her reintegration into society. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend 
that the behaviour had not occurred if it poses a threat to the safety of others. 
  
The 2016 advisory group was alert to this dilemma and sought to steer a middle 
course.138 It recommended that information about children under 12 submitted by the 
police under the statutory schemes should only be disclosed in exceptional 
circumstances and that this should apply retrospectively to information about past 
criminal conduct by the under-12s. Crucially, it also recommended the introduction of 
independent mediation, by ‘a party with expertise or knowledge in risk management’, of 
the decision to disclose.139 It did not consider the informal scheme that relies wholly on 
police discretion and it would certainly be desirable that any additional safeguards 
should apply there too.  
 
Concluding thoughts: why the recommended reform may succeed this time 
 
The most recent advisory group to examine the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
in Scotland has recommended that it be raised from 8 to 12 years old. That 
recommendation comes as no surprise. An abundance of modern, academic literature, 
supported by evidence from neuroscientists, makes an overwhelming case for raising 
the age. International bodies, not least the United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, have been urging this course of action for many years. Other jurisdictions, 
particularly those in Europe and the rest of the developed world, have adopted ages 
higher – sometimes significantly higher – than 8.  
 
At the outset, it was suggested that there is a very real prospect that the 
recommendation will lead to law reform in the near future. Given that we have been 
here before, as recently as 2000, that prediction may seem unduly optimistic, even 
foolhardy. Why might the outcome be different this time? Any law reform proposal will 
have the optimum chance of success if it is supported by government. Politicians have 
                                                          
138 The Report of the Advisory Group on the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility, note 3, above, 
chapter 5. 
139 Ibid, para 5.14. 
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many reasons – ideological, fiscal, diplomatic, pragmatic – for supporting a particular 
measure and are undoubtedly influenced by how well they anticipate it being received 
by stakeholders and the public. As we have seen, there is widespread support amongst 
the legal profession, children’s rights groups and academics for raising the age of 
criminal responsibility. What, then, of the general public? 
 
There is little doubt that the recommendation of the 2000 advisory group suffered from 
unfortunate timing since it coincided with a ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric that reflected 
something of an antipathy towards children and young people, generally, and those who 
offended, in particular. In its Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, in 2008, 
the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern over the 
negative stereotyping of young people across society, particularly in the media.140 While 
it mentioned that concern again in its most recent Concluding Observations,141 it did not 
elaborate. In the interim, the Scottish Government has developed various strategies 
designed to combat negative images of young people and has expressed its continuing 
commitment on that score.142  To be fair, public perceptions of young people were 
probably never as negative as those presented in sections of the media and, in truth, 
there is no single perception.143 Nonetheless, efforts to create a more positive image of 
children and young people may make the public more open to the idea of raising the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility. 
 
Perhaps the most significant development, in Scotland, is a heightened government 
awareness of children’s rights and a more sophisticated understanding of what is 
                                                          
140 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/CO/4, 3 October 2008, para 25(a). 
141 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic 
report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, 3 June 2016, para 
22. 
142 Do the Right Thing - a progress report on the Scottish Government's response to the 2008 concluding 
observations from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2012), 
15-16.  
143 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2009 (Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2010): ‘Adults tend to display 
concern both for and about young people’ (para 5.3) and ‘67% [of those surveyed] agreed that “most 
young people in this area are responsible and well behaved”’ (para 5.4). 
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required for their implementation.144 Successive administrations have been keen to 
demonstrate their commitment to children’s rights145 and there are examples the 
fundamental principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child being articulated in 
pre-devolution legislation on family law, child protection and the children’s hearings 
system.146 While it would be grossly premature to suggest that children’s rights are as 
fully integrated into the Scottish legal system as they ought to be, there is a sense of 
making some progress towards that end. 
 
The Scottish Government’s (irritating) attachment to repeating the mantra of Scotland 
becoming ‘the best place in the world to grow up in’ has been noted, as have continuing 
problems associated with poverty. There is evidence, however, of very real 
governmental efforts to move beyond sloganizing. That those efforts can sometimes be 
ill-conceived or badly executed is illustrated by the debacle surrounding the Named 
Person scheme.147 Rather less contentious have been the more comprehensive reforms 
designed to address the needs of the most vulnerable children. Some of these efforts 
have been directed at preventing offending and at diverting offenders from the formal 
system.148  As a result, the number of 8-11 year-olds referred to a children’s hearing on 
the basis of their own alleged offending has fallen by 73% in the last 5 years, with a 
drop from 799 cases, in 2010-11, to 215, in 2014-15.149 While these figures are, in large 
                                                          
144 In a recent appeal in Scotland’s highest criminal court in a case involving a relatively rare example of 
prosecution of a juvenile, there was an encouraging reference from the bench to the Un Convention 
principles on juvenile justice. See, Adam McCormick v HM Advocate [2016] HCJAC 50 [4]. 
145 Report on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Scotland 1999–2007 
(Scottish Executive, Edinburgh 2007); Do the Right Thing (Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2009); Do 
the Right Thing - a progress report on the Scottish Government's response to the 2008 concluding 
observations from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, note 142, above.  
146 The Children (Scotland) Act 1995, addressing the child in the family setting, originally governed child 
protection and the children’s hearings system as well. It was drafted with the CRC in mind and articulated 
some of the fundamental principles. Regulation of child protection and children’s hearings is now 
addressed largely in other statutes, but the CRC principles remain present. 
147 Christian Institute v Scottish Ministers [2016] UKSC 51.   
148 Claire Lightower, David Orr and Nina Vaswani, Youth Justice in Scotland: Fixed in the past or fit for the 
future? (Centre for Youth and Criminal Justice, Glasgow 2014) and Preventing Youth Offending: Getting it 
Right for Children and Young People (Scottish Government, Edinburgh 2015). For a current overview, 
see the ‘Whole System Approach to Young People who Offend’ section of the Scottish Government 
website: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/policies/young-offending/whole-system-approach  
149 SCRA Annual Report 2014/15 (Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration, Stirling 2015). 
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part, a product of systemic changes, the statistics can only assist in making any 
increase in the minimum age of criminal responsibility more publicly palatable.   
 
The Scottish Government itself has something of an incentive to make progress on 
raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility. When what became the Children and 
Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 was making its way through the Scottish Parliament, 
the government resisted calls to include a provision incorporating the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child into Scots law,150 something that would have 
given that instrument the same legal status, in Scotland, as attaches to the European 
Convention on Human Rights throughout the United Kingdom.151 Instead, the Act places 
the Scottish Ministers under statutory obligations to promote awareness of children’s 
rights; to ‘keep under consideration’ whether there is more they could do to give effect 
to the CRC; and to report on their progress every three years.152 For those seeking 
incorporation, that was a poor alternative, but the reporting obligation does present an 
opportunity to hold the Scottish Ministers to account on the issue of the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility. Their first report is due in 2018 and it may be they would like to 
be able to report progress at that time.153   
 
The country is currently governed by a minority Scottish Nationalist administration that 
relies on other parities for support in its legislative efforts. The ‘law and order’ lobby, 
while less vocal at the moment, is ever present. It would only take an equivalent of the 
Bulger case to occur in the country for the political climate to change and the 
momentum that has gathered behind calls for reform to vanish.  
 
Assuming, arguendo, that the minimum age of criminal responsibility in Scotland is 
                                                          
150 The Education and Culture Committee of the Scottish Parliament, 11th Report, 2013 (Session 4): 
Stage 1 Report on the Children and Young People (Scotland) Bill, paras 27-31: 
http://www.parliament.scot/S4_EducationandCultureCommittee/Reports/edR-13-11w.pdf   
151 Human Rights Act 1998. 
152 Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014, s 1. The awkward phraseology is found in the 
statute. Public authorities are subject to a similar reporting requirement in respect of the steps they have 
taken, within their areas of responsibility, to ‘secure better or further effect’ of the UN Convention: 2014 
Act, s 2 and Schedule 1. 
153 Section 1, creating the reporting obligation, was brought into force on 15 June 2015: The Children and 
Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 (Commencement No. 7) Order 2015, SSI 2016/61, art 2(3). 
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raised to 12, Scots law would have reached a significant landmark in attributing criminal 
responsibility to children and young people in a manner that is more consistent with all 
the evidence on their capacity to make decisions about their behaviour. For many, this 
landmark would be no more than a staging post on a much longer journey. When 
Thomas Hammarberg, (then) Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, 
expressed support for raising the age of criminal responsibility, it was ‘with the aim of 
progressively reaching 18’.154 In that, he was reflecting the view of many children’s 
rights advocates: that meaningful realisation of children’s rights is an incremental 
process. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. For the present, the focus must be on 
bringing to fruition the goal of raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 12. 
                                                          
154 Thomas Hammarberg, ‘The human rights dimension of juvenile justice’, CommDH/Speech (2006) 12. 
